Consistent Risk Acceptance Criteria through Networks by Cerqueti, Roy & Lupi, Claudio
Università degli Studi del Molise
Dipartimento di Economia, Gestione, Società e Istituzioni
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMICS & STATISTICS DISCUSSION PAPER
No. 076/15
 
 
 
Consistent Risk Acceptance Criteria through Networks
 
 
 
Roy Cerqueti
 
Claudio Lupi
The Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
The views expressed in the papers are solely the responsibility of the authors.
Consistent Risk Acceptance Criteria
through Networks
Roy Cerqueti1
University of Macerata — Department of Economics and Law
Claudio Lupi
University of Molise — Department of Economics
April 18, 2015
1Corresponding author: University of Macerata, Department of Economics and
Law. Via Crescimbeni, 20. I-62100 Macerata, Italy. Tel.: +39 0733 258 3246 –
Fax: +39 0733 258 3205 – E-mail: roy.cerqueti@unimc.it
Abstract
In decision theory projects are usually evaluated in terms of their riski-
ness, and often decision under risk is intended as the one-shot-type binary
choice of accepting or not accepting the risk. This paper elaborates on the
concept of risk acceptance, and aims at developing a theoretical framework
based on networks theory. In doing this, the interconnections between the
random quantities involved in the decision are taken into account. The
conditions to be satisfied in order for the risk-acceptance criterion to be
consistent with the axiomatization of standard expected utility theory are
also explored. In accordance with existing literature, we obtain that a risk
evaluation problem can be meaningful even if it is not consistent with the
standard axiomatization of expected utility. Some illustrative examples are
also provided.
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1 Introduction
Risk avoidance or acceptance is the basis of decision theory. A risk is ac-
cepted when the cost of its avoidance is higher than a predetermined thresh-
old. In other words: a risk is accepted when, once a criterion for risk eval-
uation is fixed, the risk level is below a predetermined threshold (see, e.g.
Fischhoff et al., 1981; Aven, 2003, 2007). Thus, to provide a scientific repre-
sentation of individual choices on risk acceptance, the formalization of the
mechanism for risk evaluation is required.
It is widely accepted that individuals are not risk-neutral, and several
important theories have been developed on this fact, mostly building upon
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) seminal contribution. The basic
idea is that realizations of random amounts should be filtered through the
so-called utility function, to capture the evidence that risky quantities are
evaluated for what they represent for the decision maker, rather than under
an objective basis. This important framework is formalized by five axioms,
which are satisfied under expected utility maximization:
A.1 Weak order — Preferences are: 1) complete, i.e. the decider can state
whether two lotteries are equivalent or whether one is preferred to the
other; 2) transitive, i.e. given three lotteries X,Y, Z, if X is preferred
to Y and Y is preferred to Z, then X is preferred to Z; 3) reflexive,
i.e. the decision-maker is indifferent between two similar lotteries.
A.2 Continuity — Given three different lotteries X,Y, Z such that X is
preferred to Y and Y is preferred to Z, then there exists a number
p ∈ (0, 1] such that the decider is indifferent between the compounded
lottery pX + (1− p)Z and Y .
A.3 Preferences increasing with probability — Consider two lotteries
X and Y with only two outcomes a and b, where a > b. The decider
prefers X to Y if and only if P (X = a) > P (Y = a).
1
A.4 Compound probabilities — Consider a compound lottery X whose
outcomes are two lotteries X1 (with probability p) and X2 (with prob-
ability 1−p). Then lottery X is indifferent to the simple lottery given
by the outcomes of X1 and X2 with probabilities obtained by the prod-
uct of those of the outcomes of X1 with p (those of the outcomes of
X2 with 1− p).
A.5 Independence — Consider two lotteries X and Y sharing a common
outcome a and suppose that the decider prefers X to Y . If the lotteries
X˜ and Y˜ are obtained by replacing a with a˜ in X and Y , respectively,
then the decider prefers X˜ to Y˜ .
Violations of the expected utility theory axioms are at the center of the de-
bate in decision theory (see, e.g. Loomes, 1991; Katsikopoulos and Gigeren-
zer, 2008). However, decision rules inconsistent with expected utility theory
are not necessarily meaningless. In this respect, a risk acceptance crite-
rion compared to the axiomatization of the expected utility theory has been
proposed by Abrahamsen and Aven (2008). These authors face an engi-
neering reliability problem and introduce the FAR value as the expected
number of fatalities per 100 million exposed hours. From their point of
view, the risk should be accepted when the FAR value is less than 10. How-
ever, Abrahamsen and Aven (2008) show that FAR value risk acceptance
criterion is not consistent with the independence axiom of expected utility.
Their conclusions elaborate on the perspective of the decision maker with-
out philosophically rejecting neither models violating the expected utility
axioms nor their utility-based counterparts.
On the same basis of the above-quoted paper, some authors elaborate on
the so-called non-linear utility theory, and provide also acceptance criteria
grounded on the analysis of the probability distributions of the involved
random variables (see, e.g. Geiger, 2002, 2005, 2008, and the references
therein).
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Criticisms on the setting of a-priori criteria for deciding whenever ac-
cepting a risk are expressed by Aven and Vinnem (2005), who write:
“introduction of pre-determined criteria may give the wrong fo-
cus — meeting these criteria rather than obtaining overall good
and cost/effective solutions and measures.”
More specifically, Aven and Vinnem (2005) discuss risk acceptance for envi-
ronmental protection in the context of fossil fuels extraction and argue that
a risk should be properly characterized and evaluated to construct suitable
risk acceptance criteria.
This paper shares the same perspective of Aven and Vinnem (2005), and
presents a model for risk acceptance taking care of the main characteristics
of the problem. In particular, risk is measured through a network theory ap-
proach, to capture the presence of interaction between the random variables
determining the risk level. In doing this, we contribute to the field of liter-
ature related to the so-called systemic risk, which is much interested in the
evaluation of the interconnections within the components of a system (for
the paradigmatic application of systemic risk in the banking sector see, e.g.
Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Freixas et al., 2000; Bartram et al., 2007; Haldane
and May, 2011). More specifically, we are particularly close to (Leippold and
Vanini, 2003), where the authors elaborate on operational risk acceptance in
a network analysis framework. In details, (Leippold and Vanini, 2003) argue
that there are many risky variables driving the risk acceptance decision, and
they present a topological and a stochastic dependence structure.
Here we model the set of decision variables — the random variables in-
volved in the risk acceptance problem — and their connections by a specific
network, and opportunely define a network measure to evaluate the risk. A
numerical threshold for the network measure is then introduced to identify
acceptable and not-acceptable risks.1 Finally, following the line traced by
1For a survey on the theory of networks, we refer the interested reader to Wasserman
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Hendon et al. (1994) and Abrahamsen and Aven (2008), the proposed cri-
terion is compared with classical decision theory. With this aim, we rewrite
some axioms of the expected utility theory in the language of networks. In
particular, we show that a suitable definition of the model terms leads to a
criterion which fulfils the standard expected utility axiomatization. On the
other hand, we also show that inconsistency with respect to expected utility
theory does not necessarily imply meaningless risk-acceptance criteria.
To develop our arguments, the algebraic structure of the set of networks
is fully explored, and the binary operators of sum and product by scalars
are suitably defined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next Section con-
tains the formal definition of the set of networks, with the assessment of
its algebraic structure; Section 3 outlines the risk-acceptance criterion, and
presents also some relevant examples and applications supporting the de-
veloped model under a more practical point of view; Section 4 discusses
the connections between the proposed criterion and the axiomatizations of
expected utility theory; the last Section offers some concluding remarks.
2 The set of networks
Consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P), which contains all the random quan-
tities that will be defined in this paper.
We denote by A the set collecting all the random variables defined in
the probability space (Ω,F ,P). The risk acceptance problem is assumed to
be identified by the behaviour of some relevant random quantities, which
are collected in a subset S of A defined as:
S = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} ⊆ A. (1)
We will refer to the set S as the decision set, where the variables X1, X2, . . . ,
and Faust (1994), and Scott (2013).
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Xn are the decision variables.
The decision set S is here viewed as the set of the nodes (vertices) of a
weighted oriented graph. There exist weights both for the arcs and for the
nodes of the graph. Specifically, under a pure formal perspective:
• there exists a function ρ : S → R such that ρ(Xj) = ρj is the weight
of the node Xj , for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
• we introduce a binary variable for the identification of the arcs of the
graph:
v(i, j) =
 1, if there exists the oriented arc connecting i and j,0, otherwise;
for each i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. The case of i = j is associated to the
presence of a self-connection of the node i with itself;
• a measure for the asymmetric (oriented) connection between each cou-
ple of elements of the decision set is introduced, namely: δi→j ∈ R
is the measure of the oriented arc from Xi to Xj , for each i, j =
1, 2, . . . , n, i 6= j. The numbers δ’s represent the weights related to
the n2 edges, which are given by n(n− 1) coupled connections and n
self-connections. It is worth noting that the orientation is meaningless
when considering the self connections. However, for the sake of sim-
plicity, we adopt also in this case the ”oriented notation” and write
δi→i, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The graph is then fully identified by the knowledge of its nodes and the
related functions ρ’s, v’s and δ’s. The resulting quadruple is a network N
as follows:
N = (S, ρ, v, δ) , (2)
where ρ = {ρj}j=1,2,...,n, v = {v(i, j)}i,j=1,2,...,n and δ = {δi→j}i,j=1,2,...,n.
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The space of the networks is then given by
Net =
{
(S, ρ, v, δ) ∈ P(A)× R|S| × {0, 1}|S|2 × R|S|2
}
,
where P(?) indicates the set of the part of ?.
The risk problems are then here modeled through specific networks,
which are assumed in the present framework to fully describe the inves-
tigated risky projects (to be or not to be accepted).
2.1 Algebraic structure of the set Net
This section contains the discussion on some algebraic properties of the set
Net. In so doing, we pursue three scopes: first, we convince the reader that
the space of networks is rather wide, and can be properly used to model
a relevant number of risky projects; second, we construct the theoretical
framework for introducing a risk-acceptance criterion based on networks;
third, we offer the instruments for checking whenever such a risk-acceptance
criterion is consistent with the axiomatization of the expected utility theory.
To proceed, we need the definition of the concept of equivalence of net-
works within the set of the elements of Net.
Definition 1. Consider two networks
Nk =
(
S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)
)
∈ Net, k = 1, 2.
We say that N1 is equivalent to N2 — and we write N1 ≡ N2 — when one
of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i)
(S(1), ρ(1), v(1), δ(1)) = (S(2), ρ(2), v(2), δ(2));
(ii) S(1) = S(2), ρ(1)j = ρ(2)j for each j and, if 1 = v(k1)(i, j) 6= v(k2)(i, j) =
0, then δ(k1)(i→ j) = 0, for each i, j indices of the nodes of S(k1) and
k1, k2 = 1, 2 with k1 6= k2;
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(iii) if Xj ∈ S(k1) \ S(k2), then ρ(k1)j = 0 and δ(k1)i→j = 0, for each i index of
the nodes in S(k1) and k1, k2 = 1, 2 with k1 6= k2.
The equivalence relation introduced in Definition 1 leads to the identifi-
cation of equivalence classes in the set Net. It assumes that a zero-weighted
connection means absence of connection and a node with zero weight can be
removed from the decision set. These conditions will turn out to be useful
in the definition of the risk measures on Net.
Remark 1. Given a network N, it is possible to construct a network N˜
equivalent to N by adding further nodes j1, . . . , jk such that ρj = 0 and
δi→j = δj→i = 0, for each j = j1, . . . , jk and for each i-th node of N˜. Hence,
under such conditions on the weights of arcs and nodes, it is not restrictive
to assume that networks share the same set of nodes, which is the maximal
one. Moreover, it is also equivalent to consider v(i, j) = 0 or, alternatively,
v(i, j) = 1 and δi→j = δj→i = 0. Therefore, under the condition of null
weights of disconnected arcs, it is not restrictive to assume v(i, j) = 1, for
each i, j.
It is worth exploring the topological structure of Net by introducing the
operators acting on it.
Definition 2. Consider N1,N2 ∈ Net such that Nk ≡
(S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k))
for k = 1, 2.
The direct sum of N1 and N2 is
N1 ⊕N2 ≡ N, (3)
where N ≡ (S, ρ, v, δ) with S = S(1) ∪S(2) and, for each i, j = 1, . . . , n, it is
ρj = ρ
(1)
j + ρ
(2)
j , δi→j = δ
(1)
i→j + δ
(2)
i→j and v(i, j) = max{v(1)(i, j), v(2)(i, j)}.
By Definition 2, the direct sum of two networks is equivalent to a new
one with all the nodes and the connections existing in the two summed
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networks. The weights of the new network comes out from aggregating —
i.e. summing — those of the summed ones.
We note that the distinction between the sets of nodes S(1) and S(2)
and the connection binary variables v(1) and v(2) are useful here to have an
intuitive view of the concept of summed networks, even if Remark 1 could
suggest to impose S(1) = S(2) and v(i, j) = 1, for each i, j.
Definition 3. Consider N ≡ (S, ρ, v, δ) ∈ Net and a scalar α ∈ R.
The product scalar-network α ·N is a new network Nα ≡
(S, ρ(α), v, δ(α))
such that ρ
(α)
j = α · ρj and δ(α)i→j = α · δi→j, for each i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 3 explains that a scale factor applied to a network plays the
role of applying such a scale factor to the weights of the arcs and the nodes
of the network.
The assessment of the topological structure of the set Net — endowed
with the binary operator ⊕ — is of particular relevance for adapting to
the network framework the axiomatization of expected utility theory. We
formalize this topological framework as follows:
Theorem 1. The couple (Net,⊕) is an Abelian group.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need to check the validity of the five axioms
identifying an Abelian group2.
G.1 If N1,N2 ∈ Net, then N1 ⊕N2 ∈ Net.
This is a direct consequence of Definition 2.
G.2 If N1,N2,N3 ∈ Net, then N1 ⊕ [N2 ⊕N3] ≡ [N1 ⊕N2]⊕N3.
In fact, define Nk ≡
(S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)) for k = 1, 2, 3.
2For the concept of Abelian group see, e.g. Robinson (1996).
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Then, this axiom is easily verified, being:
(
S(1) ∪ S(2)
)
∪ S(3) = S(1) ∪
(
S(2) ∪ S(3)
)
;(
ρ
(1)
j + ρ
(2)
j
)
+ ρ
(3)
j = ρ
(1)
j +
(
ρ
(2)
j + ρ
(3)
j
)
∀ j ;(
δ
(1)
i→j + δ
(2)
i→j
)
+ δ
(3)
i→j = δ
(1)
i→j +
(
δ
(2)
i→j + δ
(3)
i→j
)
∀ i, j ;
max
[
max{v(1)(i, j), v(2)(i, j)}, v(3)(i, j)
]
= max
[
v(1)(i, j),
max{v(2)(i, j), v(3)(i, j)}
]
∀ i, j .
G.3 There exists an unique null network N0 ∈ Net such that N0 ⊕N ≡
N⊕N0 ≡ N, for each N ∈ Net.
In fact, consider N ≡ (S, ρ, v, δ) and define the null network N0 ≡(S(0), ρ(0), v(0), δ(0)) such that:
S(0) = S
ρ
(0)
j = 0 ∀ j ∈ S(0);
δ
(0)
i→j = 0 ∀ i, j | v(0)(i, j) = 1;
v(0) arbitrary.
Definition 2 gives that N⊕N0 ≡ N0 ⊕N ≡ N.
The uniqueness — to be intended in the sense of the equivalence classes
introduced in Definition 1 — comes out from Definitions 1 and 2.
G.4 Consider N ∈ Net. There exists the inverse network N−1 ∈ Net such
that N−1 ⊕N ≡ N⊕N−1 ≡ N0.
In fact, denote N ≡ (S, ρ, v, δ) and define N−1 ≡ (S−1, ρ−1, v−1, δ−1)
such that: 
S−1 = S
ρ−1j = −ρj ∀ j ∈ S−1;
v−1(i, j) ≥ v(i, j) ∀ i, j;
δ−1i→j = −δi→j ∀ i, j | v−1(i, j) = v(i, j);
δ−1i→j = 0 ∀ i, j | v−1(i, j) > v(i, j).
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By Definition 2 we have N⊕N−1 ≡ N−1 ⊕N ≡ N0.
G.5 The operator ⊕ is commutative in Net, i.e. N1 ⊕N2 ≡ N2 ⊕N1, for
each N1,N2 ∈ Net.
The validity of this axiom is due to Definition 2, by applying the
commutative property of the operator ∪ and + over their respective
action sets.
Validity of G.1–G.5 proves the Theorem.
The following result states that the set Net is closed with respect to
linear combinations, to be intended in the sense of Definitions 2 and 3.
Proposition 1. Consider α1, α2 ∈ R and N1,N2 ∈ Net such that Nk ≡(S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)) for k = 1, 2.
Then α1 ·N1 ⊕ α2 ·N2 ∈ Net.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Definition 3.
A simple and meaningful consequence of Proposition 1 is the following:
Corollary 1. The set Net is convex.
Proof. The proof comes out from Proposition 1, by considering α1, α2 ∈
[0, 1], with α1 + α2 = 1.
3 Risk acceptance criterion
A general concept of risk measure on networks is now introduced. More
details and illustrative examples will be provided below.
Definition 4. A risk measure on networks is a function µ : Net→ R such
that:
• N1 ≡ N2 if and only if µ(N1) = µ(N2);
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• the function µ induces a total order µ in Net as follows:
µ(N1) ≤ µ(N2) if and only if N1 µ N2,
for each N1,N2 ∈ Net;
• µ(N1) < µ(N2) means that N1 is less risky — in the sense captured
by the preference order µ — than N2.
We collect the risk measures on networks in a set MNet.
Definition 4 is rather general. It simply states that any function which
respects the equivalence between networks — in the sense that it assigns
an identical value to equivalent networks — and which induces a prefer-
ence order describing riskiness over Net is a risk measure on networks. Of
course, each risk can be viewed as a network belonging to a specific subset
of Net? ⊆ Net which contains networks with peculiar characteristics. In
this respect, Definition 4 can be rewritten by considering a restriction of µ
to an opportunely defined Net? which induces a total order on it. To assist
the reader in grasping this point, an example is provided below.
The uniqueness of the risk measure on networks is also a relevant theme,
and it is quite simple to see that networks can be identically ordered by
employing different µ’s. The following Definition is, then, particularly useful:
Definition 5. Consider two risk measures on networks µk : Net→ R, with
k = 1, 2.
µ1 is equivalent to µ2 — and we indicate µ1 ≡ µ2 — if and only if
µ1(N1) ≤ µ1(N2) if and only if µ2(N1) ≤ µ2(N2),
for each N1,N2 ∈ Net.
Definition 5 leads to the identification of equivalence classes over the set
MNet.
The following example contributes to the understanding of the arguments
exposed above:
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Example 1. A financial institution offers to Frank and Lisa the same struc-
tured product which can be replicated by a portfolio composed by units of three
risky assets with stochastic uniperiodal returns X1, X2 and X3. The shares
of capital forming the replication portfolio are (x1, x2, x3),being xj the per-
centage of the capital invested in the asset with return Xj, for j = 1, 2, 3. It
is assumed that x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, i.e. the entire capital is invested. More-
over, xj ∈ [0, 1], i.e. short selling is not allowed. In a uniperiodal world, the
investor must take a decision by guessing what will happen at time 1.
Frank evaluates the riskiness of the product by computing the maximum
value of the Pearson correlation coefficients between couples of returns mul-
tiplied with the related shares of portfolio.
In this case, each portfolio can be represented through a (symmetric)
network NF , where the subscript F means ”related to Frank”. The subset
of Net containing such portfolios is denoted by NetF and, evidently, it is
not unique. A meaningful definition of NetF is the following:
• the decision variables — i.e. the vertices of each network NF ∈ NetF
— are fixed, and given by X1, X2 and X3;
• the weights of the (oriented) arcs are fixed, and given by:
δi→j = δj→i =
C [Xi, Xj ]√
V [Xi] ·
√
V [Xj ]
, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j,
where C and V are the covariance and variance operator, respectively;
• since, by definition of the correlation coefficient, there exists a connec-
tion between each couple of different nodes (self-connection and unitary
correlation coefficient is not introduced in Frank’s decision process),
then v(i, j) = 1 for each i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j, and v(i, i) = 0, for each
i = 1, 2, 3;
• functions ρ’s are given by the shares of portfolio, so that ρj = xj, for
j = 1, 2, 3. Hence, ρ ∈ [0, 1]3.
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The risk measure adopted by Frank is (equivalent to) µF : NetF → [−1, 1]
such that:
µF (NF ) ≡ max
i,j=1,2,3; i 6=j
v(i, j)ρiρjδi→j . (4)
Lisa has a different strategy. She takes X1 as reference return, and eval-
uates the risk of a portfolio by making the difference between the probabilities
that x1 ·X1 is greater than x2 ·X2 and that it is greater than x3 ·X3.
Portfolios can be modeled through networks NL ∈ NetL ⊆ Net, where
the subscript L means ”referred to Lisa”. A meaningful definition of the
subset NetL is the following:
• the vertices of the networks are, also in this case, X1, X2 and X3;
• the weights of the (oriented) arcs are given by:
δi→j = P [xi ·Xi > xj ·Xj ] , i = 1, j = 2, 3. (5)
Hence,
δi→j ∈
 [0, 1], if i = 1 and j = 2, 3;R, otherwise;
• the binary variables in v are given by
v(i, j) =
 1, if (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (1, 3)}0, otherwise.
• ρ ∈ R3.
The risk measure on networks adopted by Lisa is (equivalent to) µL : NetL →
[−1, 1] such that:
µL(NL) ≡ δ1→3 − δ1→2. (6)
Some comments on Example 1 are in order: Frank and Lisa’s decision
processes proceed through the analysis of the weights of the arcs and of
the nodes. In particular, Frank considers a specific subfamily of networks
NetF ⊂ Net, with nodes given by the stochastic returns X1, X2, X3, the δ’s
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given by the correlation coefficients and v(i, j) = 1 if and only if i 6= j, and
all the possible nonnegative weights ρ’s for the nodes whose sum is unitary.
NetF collects the available portfolios obtained by the assets with returns
X1, X2 and X3 and correlation coefficients captured by the vector δ.
By construction, Frank refuses the risk in the case of a replicating port-
folio of polarized type, i.e. in presence of a couple of nodes (Xi, Xj) with a
high value of ρi and ρj and also a great level of connection δi→j . Polarized
portfolios are those where the main part of the capital is shared among the
returns with a high correlation coefficients, probably positively correlated.
The motivation for rejecting such a risk could be found in the attitude to-
wards the risk of Frank, who seems to be risk-averse. In fact, the polarized
portfolios defined above are, in the general theory of finance, those more
risky, even if they provide a great level of expected return.
As far as Lisa’s perspective is concerned, she considers a subset of net-
works NetL ⊂ Net, with nodes given by the stochastic returns X1, X2, X3,
v(i, j) = 1 if and only if (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (1, 3)}, the δ’s belonging to [0, 1]
and all the possible nonnegative weights ρ’s for the nodes whose sum is
unitary. As in the Frank’s case, the set NetL collects the available portfo-
lios obtained by the assets with returns X1, X2 and X3. However, on the
basis of the different definition of the weights of nodes and arcs, we have
NetL 6= NetF . Moreover, it is interesting to note that the network measure
µL(NL) increases when the realizations of X2 grow and those of X3 decrease,
letting the other quantities be the same. This is a direct consequence of def-
inition (6) and of the remark that, in this case, P [X1 > X2] decreases and
P [X1 > X3] increases. More formally, fix a portfolio (x1, x2, x3) and con-
struct two networks
N
(a)
L ≡
(
{X1, X(a)2 , X(a)3 }, ρ, v, δ(a)
)
, N
(b)
L ≡
(
{X1, X(b)2 , X(b)3 }, ρ, v, δ(b)
)
,
where X
(a)
2 >SD1 X
(b)
2 , X
(b)
3 >SD1 X
(a)
3 and the δ’s are defined according to
(5). Then µL(N
(a)
L ) ≥ µL(N(b)L ).
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¿From a behavioural finance point of view, return X1 represents an an-
chor for Lisa’s decision process. The assessment of how rational is the
selection of such an anchor is beyond the scopes of the present paper, but
it is clear that X1 can be a financially reasonable reference point or, simply,
the effect of a psychological bias (see Ritter, 2003).
Example 1 suggests also the presence of a couple of thresholds HF , HL ∈
[−1, 1] such that Frank (Lisa) purchases the portfolio NF ∈ NetF (NL ∈
NetL) if and only if µF (NF ) ≤ HF (µL(NL) ≤ HL).
We are now in the position of defining the risk acceptance criterion.
Definition 6. Consider a risk measure on networks µ ∈MNet and a con-
stant H ∈ (0,+∞). Moreover, consider a risk modeled through a network
N ∈ Net.
Network N is said to be an acceptable risk at level H if and only if
µ(N) ≤ H. (7)
Definition 6 is in accord to the concept of risk measure on networks
introduced in Definition 4. In fact, Definition 6 says implicitly that a great
value of µ(N) means a high level of risk for the system described by the
network N.
3.1 A real world application: insurability of nuclear risks
Insurability is a concept related to a specific risk, and represents the de-
scription of the conditions under which an insurance company has economic
convenience to stipulate a contract for insuring such a risk. It is clear that
the problem of insurability is of great relevance when the event associated
to the insured risk leads to losses of large amount, i.e. in presence of the
so-called catastrophic events.
In the context of catastrophic events, a prominent role is played by the
nuclear risk. The problem of insurability of a risk in the nuclear case is thus
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of particular interest. This task is widely discussed at an academic as well as
institutional level, and we refer to the authoritative scientific documentation
provided by Faure and Hartlief (2003). Nuclear risk is commonly acknowl-
edged to be a ”systemic” one, in that the occurrence of a nuclear disaster
has a dramatic impact on a number of human activities and environmental
entities. Hence, the evaluation of the damages generated by a nuclear ac-
cident can be performed only by analyzing the network describing all the
entities involved in the disaster, along with their interconnections and their
individual relative relevance in the overall context. Therefore we assume the
existence of a network Nnuclear = (S, ρ, v, δ) associated to the nuclear risk.
Faure and Hartlief (2003) explain that major insurance companies of any
nuclear country operate on a cooperative and non-competitive basis and pool
their resources to jointly insure the nuclear risk. This fact implicitly means
that each individual insurance company does not accept the risk, whereas is
willing to accept it only when the riskiness of the nuclear accident is suitably
reduced. This behaviour can be easily formalized in the language used in
this paper.
Indeed, consider a country withK (major) insurance companies. Assume
that the k-th company measures the nuclear risk through a risk measure on
network µk, and accepts the risk if and only if the risk measure is below a
specific threshold H¯k ∈ R, for each k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. The evidence that indi-
vidual companies do not accept the risk can be interpreted as the existence
of a real number Hk ∈ R such that
µk (Nnuclear) = Hk > H¯k,
for each k = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The pooling strategy acts by sharing the overall risk among all the K
insurance companies. Formally, the interaction among companies leads to a
transformation of the network Nnuclear into the new one N˜nuclear, with the
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convenience that there exist K weights α1, α2, . . . , αK ∈ (0, 1) such that
µk
(
N˜nuclear
)
= αk ·Hk,
and αk ·Hk < H¯k.
Hence, the cooperation reduces the nuclear risk level, and such a reduced
risk is then accepted by all the insurance companies.
4 Consistency of risk measures on networks with
the expected utility theory
The link between utility theory and risk criterion can be easily identified:
expected utility is maximized by the decision maker while the risk — cap-
tured by function µ — is minimized by the decider (and accepted only if its
level is below a certain threshold, see Definition 6).
This section contains a proposal for rewriting the classical axioms of the
expected utility theory in terms of the networks belonging to the set Net
and of the measures µ.
The way in which networks model risky projects can be appropriately
identified only through a case by case inspection. Indeed, on the basis
of the considered model, the realizations of the decision variables may be
less risky when they are great or low. In accord to this, generally there is
no direct relation between high (low) levels of weights δ’s and connections
ρ’s with high (low) risk of the associated network. Therefore, it is not
possible to propose an a-priori universal view of the networks as risk models.
However, it is still possible to construct a theoretical framework for providing
the conditions for consistency of the network risk-acceptance criterion with
standard expected utility theory.
To this end, it is important to point out that the original axioms of
expected utility theory listed in the introduction are based on a “positive
role” played by high probabilities over high realizations on the preference
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order. An illustrative example of this fact can be found in axiom A.3, where
it is clear that higher probabilities of higher realizations are preferred. This
is of course a conventional agreement needed for stating an axiomatization
of the expected utility theory. However, it is not the unique way to read
the concept of lottery. In fact, lotteries X and Y could be a-priori defined
as the amount to be lost by the player. In this case, axiom A.3 should be
reverted to maintain reasonableness in decision theory.
We here move from an analogous basis. In particular, we prepare —
when needed — the theoretical ground for deriving the conditions on µ such
that the risk-acceptance criterion of Definition 6 fits with the axioms of
expected utility theory.
The following two Propositions explain the conditions on µ to let axioms
A.1 and A.2 be satisfied by µ. After them, in order to proceed, we need to
provide a reformulation of axioms A.3–A.5 in the language of networks (see
axioms A.3′–A.5′).
Proposition 2. Consider µ ∈MNet and the induced order preference µ.
Then, µ satisfies the weak order axiom.
Proof. We discuss separately the three properties leading to the weak order
axiom.
1) Completeness is due to the property of the risk measures on networks
of inducing a total order over the set Net.
2) Transitivity comes out easily from Definition 4, being the preference
order µ over Net induced — by means of the real function µ — by the
preference order ≤ over R.
3) Reflexivity is a direct consequence of Definition 4, for which N1 ≡ N2
if and only if µ(N1) = µ(N2), for each N1,N2 ∈ Net.
Proposition 3. Assume that µ ∈MNet satisfies one of the following con-
ditions:
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(i) µ is independent from the weights δ’s and it is linear with respect to
ρj, for each j = 1, . . . , n;
(ii) µ is independent from the weights ρ’s and it is linear with respect to
δi→j, for each i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Then the induced order preference µ satisfy the continuity axiom.
Proof. Consider three networks N1,N2,N3 ∈ Net such that N1 µ N2 and
N2 µ N3. Then we can write
µ(N1) ≤ µ(N2) ≤ µ(N3),
which means that there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
µ(N2) = pµ(N1) + (1− p)µ(N3).
To prove the result, we need to check that
µ(N) = pµ(N1) + (1− p)µ(N3),
with
N ≡ p ·N1 ⊕ (1− p) ·N3. (8)
Under Remark 1, define the networks as follows: Nk ≡
(S, ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)),
for k = 1, 2, 3. Then, Definitions 3 and 2 and formula (8) lead to N ≡
(S, ρ, v, δ), with
ρj = pρ
(1)
j + (1− p)ρ(3)j ; ∀ j
δi→j = pδ
(1)
i→j + (1− p)δ(3)i→j , ∀ i, j
v(i, j) = max{v(i, j)(1), v(i, j)(3)}, ∀ i, j.
(9)
Hence, by assuming that one among conditions (i) and (ii) holds, relations
in (9) give the thesis.
We now introduce the reformulation of axioms A.3–A.5 in terms of net-
works:
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A.3′ Preference increasing with probabilities (and with connections
and weights) — Consider S(1) = {X(1)1 , X2} and S(2) = {X(2)1 , X2},
where X
(1)
1 , X
(2)
1 , X2 ∈ A and X(1)1 >SD1 X(2)2 , where >SD1 denotes
stochastic dominance of order 1.
Moreover, consider two networks Nk ≡
(S(k), ρ(k), v, δ(k)), for k = 1, 2,
such that: 
ρ
(1)
1 ≥ ρ(2)1 ;
ρ
(1)
2 = ρ
(2)
2 ;
δ
(1)
i→j ≥ δ(2)i→j , for i = 1, j = 2;
δ
(1)
i→j = δ
(2)
i→j , otherwise.
(10)
Then the decision maker prefers network N1 to N2.
Axiom A.3′ extends and complements axiom A.3 in expected utility theory.
In fact, consider the following scheme: (i) system (10) is verified with all
equalities; (ii) the variables X
(1)
1 and X
(2)
1 may assume only two realizations
a, b, with a < b; (iii) it results P (X
(1)
1 = a) < P (X
(2)
1 = a). Then axiom
A.3′ coincides with axiom A.3, being also X(1)1 >SD1 X
(2)
2 , and N1 is better
than N2.
Axiom A.3′ states also that the decider is assumed to prefer high values of
weights and connections for the nodes with better performance (to be here
intended in the general probabilistic sense of the stochastic dominance).
Of course, axiom A.3′ can be extended to the general case of n decision
variables and in presence of couples of them ordered according to stochastic
dominance of order 1.
To let the preference order µ be consistent with axiom A.3′, the network
measure µ should satisfy a natural requirement:
Proposition 4. Consider the networks Nk ≡
(S(k), ρ(k), v, δ(k)), for k =
1, 2 as in the statement of axiom A.3′, with X(1)1 >SD1 X
(2)
2 and assuming
that (10) holds.
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The order preference µ satisfies axiom A.3′ if and only if µ(N1) <
µ(N2).
Proof. By construction of the networks N1 and N2 and by the formalization
of the axiom A.3′, we obtain the thesis.
A.4′ Compound networks — Fix n ∈ N. Consider n networks Nk ≡(S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)), for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and a compound network N?
having the n networks as nodes as follows:
N? ≡ ({N1,N2, . . . ,Nn}, ρ?, v?, δ?) .
Furthermore, define N˜ ∈ Net as N˜ ≡
(
S˜, ρ˜, v˜, δ˜
)
, where
S˜ =
n⋃
k=1
S(k),
two transformations φ and ψ can be identified such that: ρ˜ = φ
(
ρ?, ρ(1), ρ(2), . . . , ρ(n)
)
;
δ˜ = ψ
(
δ?, δ(1), δ(2), . . . , δ(n)
) (11)
and, for each (i, j) ∈ S(ki) × S(kj), we have
v˜(i, j) = 1 if ki 6= kj and v?(Ni,Nj) = 1;
v˜(i, j) = 1 if ki = kj = k and v
(k)(i, j) = 1;
v˜(i, j) = 0 otherwise.
Then, two transformations φ and ψ as in (11) exist such that N˜ and
N? are equivalent for the preference order.
It is evident that axiom A.4′ represents an extension to the networks of the
corresponding axiom A.4 of expected utility theory. In fact, axiom A.4 states
the deciders reduce a multistage lottery — whose outcomes are lotteries —
to a suitably defined one-stage lottery.
We now formalize the conditions to be satisfied by µ in order to let the
preference order µ be consistent with axiom A.4′.
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Proposition 5. Fix n ∈ N, consider n networks N1,N2, . . . ,Nn and a
network N? having the n networks as nodes, as in the statement of axiom
A.4′.
Then the order preference µ satisfies axiom A.4′ if and only if two
transformations φ and ψ as in (11) exist such that:
µ
(
({N1,N2, . . . ,Nn}, ρ?, v?, δ?)
)
= µ
(
(S˜, ρ˜, v˜, δ˜)
)
.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the formalization of axiom A.4′.
A.5′ Independence — Consider two networks Nk ≡
(S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)),
for k = 1, 2. Assume that |S(1)| = |S(2)| and that N1 is preferred
to N2. Furthermore, consider S(3) ∈ P(A) and two particular com-
pounded networks N˜1, N˜2 such that:
N˜k ≡
(
S(k) ∪ S(3), ρ˜(k), v˜, δ˜(k)
)
, k = 1, 2
with: 
ρ˜(k) = ρ(k); in a componentwise sense, for k = 1, 2;
∃ ! (i1, i2) ∈ S(1) × S(2) such that δ˜(1)i1→j ≥ δ˜
(2)
i2→j ,
for each j ∈ S(3);
δ˜
(k)
i→j = δ
(k)
i→j , for i, j ∈ S(k) and k = 1, 2.
(12)
Then N˜1 is preferred to N˜2.
Axiom A.5′ provides an extension of axiom A.5 in expected utility theory.
In fact, suppose that: (i) system (12) holds with all equalities; (ii) S(k) =
{Xk}, for each k = 1, 2; (iii) X1 >SD1 X2. Then, if µ satisfies axiom A.3′,
it results that axiom A.5′ coincides with axiom A.5.
Next Proposition explains the conditions to be satisfied by µ in order to
have µ satisfying axiom A.5′.
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Proposition 6. Consider S(3) ∈ P(A), two networks N1,N2 and two com-
pounded networks N˜1 and N˜2 as in the statement of axiom A.5
′. Further-
more, suppose that system (12) holds.
Then the order preference µ satisfies axiom A.5′ if and only if µ(N1) <
µ(N2) implies µ(N˜1) < µ(N˜2).
Proof. The proof stems from the formulation of axiom A.5′.
Let us go back to Example 1, in order to show that risk-acceptance
criteria can be reasonably identified even when they do not satisfy the ax-
iomatizations of the expected utility theory.
With this aim, we limit the attention to the mathematical definition
of the risk measures on networks µF and µL as introduced in (4) and (6),
respectively.
Proposition 7. Consider the risk measures on networks µF : Net → R
and µL : Net → R in (4) and (6), respectively. Denote as F and L the
preference orders induced by µF and µL, respectively.
(i) F is not consistent with the expected utility theory;
(ii) L satisfies axioms A.1, A.2, A.3′, A.4′, A.5′, hence being consistent
with the axiomatization of the expected utility theory.
Proof. We discuss separately the two cases.
(i) By (4), it is easily obtained that µF is not linear neither with respect
to δi→j nor ρj , for the presence of the max operator. Therefore, F
does not satisfy axiom A.3′, and so it is not consistent with the ax-
iomatization of the expected utility theory.
(ii) Propositions 2 and 3 guarantee that L satisfies axioms A.1 and A.2.
Formula (6) assures that µL is linear with respect to δi→j and inde-
pendent from the weights ρ’s, hence leading to the fulfillment of axiom
A.3′.
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Consider the networks N˜ and N? defined as in the statement of axiom
A.4′. Assume that the transformation ψ of (11) is such that δ˜i→j =
δ?i→j , for i = 1 and j = 2, 3. Then µL(N
?) = µL(N˜), and this means
that axiom A.4′ is satisfied by L.
Consider two networks Nk ≡
(S(k), ρ(k), v(k), δ(k)), with k = 1, 2, such
that µL(N1) < µL(N2). Moreover, consider S(3) ∈ P(A) and define
two compounded networks N˜k, with k = 1, 2, as in the statement
of axiom A.5′. By the third relation of system (12), we have that
µL(N˜1) < µL(N˜2) and axiom A.5
′ holds for L.
Example 1 and Proposition 7 confirm the conclusion advocated in Abra-
hamsen and Aven (2008) that the use of risk-acceptance criteria is not nec-
essarily consistent with expected utility theory.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we discuss the concept of risk-acceptance, when risks are mod-
eled through networks. We propose a description of the algebraic structure
of the set of networks, in order to better formalize the theoretical framework
we deal with. With this aim, we offer a reformulation of some of the axioms
of expected utility theory, extended in the language of networks. Moreover,
we show that the risk measures — and the risk-acceptance criterion — can
be properly selected to achieve a consistency condition of the related pref-
erence order with the usual expected utility axiomatization. It is important
to note that inconsistency with expected utility does not lead to meaning-
less risk-acceptance criteria. On this point we agree with Abrahamsen and
Aven (2008), who elaborate on the not meaningless inconsistency of decision
theory with commonly adopted risk-acceptance problems.
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